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Hungarian industry has more or less overcome the difficulties caused by large scale labour turnover. However, the nation­wide social debate on the subject has not so far resulted in a 
systematic clarification of the phenomenon seen as a special but 
certainly not unique and isolated type of behaviour. We have not yet 
managed to see it as a dialectical system of relationships in which 
every element can be considered as a motive, every indirect and direct 
relationship having its place and weight.
It is no longer the social problem of labour turnover which pri­
marily justifies our attention to the subject, but precisely the feeling 
of inadequacy experienced in the face of evaluations and measures 
related to the phenomenon. What we lack is systematic analysis and 
concepts which could have come from the debate over this critical 
phenomenon. We lack this because in addition to needing an evalua­
tion of large scale floating from one working place to another, we 
also lack a starting point to handle and analyse other difficulties still 
appearing in industry, as for example problems related to the organi­
zation of labour and workshop discipline. In this paper we use 
organizational sociology to seek to contribute to an overdue, but still 
necessary, systematic account.1
Organizational Phenomena2
When labour leaves one enterprise and enters another this can 
be analysed within the enterprise— an economic organization which 
itself cannot be interpreted without both theoretical and practical 
knowledge of organizational and human relationships. Leaving a 
particular enterprise voluntarily is an expression of absolute or relative 
dissatisfaction with the organization, felt by an individual, group or 
stratum. This expression manifests itself in practice as an open refusal 
to continue co-operation. A  person leaving his work is an extreme case 
in the wide range of types of behaviour expressing dissatisfaction with 
the organization, namely: deliberately retarded output, passive slack­
ing, work on the side, waste of material, deterioration of quality, and 
the like. As with other so called negative types of behaviour, this is
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not limited to those directly employed in the field of production.
From a sociological point of view, economic organizations always 
find themselves facing the same basic problem, which is also the 
most essential problem of their operation. Under the complicated 
conditions brought about by the division of labour, they have, in order 
to pursue organizational goals, to establish co-operation and means of 
uniform control over and between individuals, groups and strata of 
different interests. Co-operation must be achieved by official regula­
tion through the hierarchical organizational structure. This will stress: 
the necessity of unity of control, relationships of subordination, super­
ordination and co-ordination, functions and related tasks, decisions 
and responsibilities, as well as the channels of information connecting 
them. All these organizations create a specific mechanism expressly 
to serve control purposes; namely, economic and non-economic stimu­
lation that strives to guide the people employed by the organizations 
towards co-operation, using rewards and sanctions, financial and non- 
financial. In our country the efforts of economic organization are 
complemented and controlled by the trade union on the one hand and 
by the Party on the other.
Although many believe in the possibility of realizing smooth co­
operation— ‘harmony’— this, in fact, appears to be an ideal that can 
be approached but never completely attained. Company interests 
and goals are directly economic and only indirectly social, irrespective 
of whether, under the pressure of circumstances, organizations strive 
to achieve ‘maximum’ rationalism and efficiency on the one hand or 
on the other implicitly seek ‘a relatively acceptable product’ and 
‘survival’. By contrast the interests and goals of those working within 
the company are directly social; they strive to meet their own economic 
and other requirements and only indirectly consider the economic 
point of view of the organization. Under socialist conditions the two 
types of interest are not antagonistically opposed to each other but 
there are a number of circumstances working against the establish­
ment and maintenance of ‘harmony’ and compromise.
Obstacles in the Way of the Compromise of Interests
Economic organizations are artificial social formations that are by 
their very nature relatively rigid and inflexible. Even if they actually 
aim at rationalism they can adapt themselves to the requirements of 
changing reality only with delay and difficulty. A  typical example of
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this is the often out-of-date piece rating and wage categorization 
system of economic incentives, which may be one of the obstacles in 
the way of successful motivation and implementation of the principle 
of payment by results. They may also generate dissatisfaction among 
workers. A t the same time, companies are organizations reflecting the 
process of technical progress and the development of the division of 
labour established in the service of a special goal. For this reason 
they are simply unable to meet certain human interests. For example, 
it would be vain for an enterprise to seek to meet the aspirations of 
all the workers of the organization to advance in their careers, if be­
cause of its hierarchic organization it only had a limited number of 
leading posts. So, at best, the economic enterprise can only make use 
of limited possibilities of compensation.
At the same time, many people ignore the fact that the economic 
organization is not the only environment which gives rise to and fulfils 
workers’ interests. Individuals, groups and strata fill varying social and 
economic positions outside the factory. They therefore enter the 
organization with aspirations which are significantly at variance not 
only with the interests of the organization, but also amongst them­
selves. These are of such complexity that an organization may find it 
almost impossible to arrive at an understanding with them. In our own 
research, for example, we found a large number of strata and groups 
with different economic interests— although these were not derived 
ultimately from differentiation of social-economic background outside 
the factory. Interventions and central regulators originating outside 
the factory from central organizations are not always adequately based 
on reality. These sometimes, therefore, present problems to the 
organization in the sphere of harmonizing interests. As in every social- 
economic process, there is resistance against any modification of the 
pre-existing human and interest relations.
Since complete harmonization of interests within an organization 
is impossible, the process of leaving places of work is normal within 
rational quantitative limits. However, we believe that large scale labour 
mobility in recent years has expressed economic and non-economic 
dissatisfactions, felt by large groups of workers.
Econom ic and Non-Econom ic M otives
When people consider to what extent they can achieve their interests 
in an organization of which they are members, irrespective of how
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conscious this consideration is, they think of both economic and non­
economic questions. Therefore, in our evaluation of the phenomenon 
of labour turnover it is wrong to attach an exclusive significance to 
either economic or non-economic reasons, since in any case economic 
and non-economic factors can only be distinguished with difficulty. 
In our country today money is not only the basis of increased welfare, 
but also the most obvious symbol of social prestige, of the apparent 
importance in the complex system of the division of labour of the 
work performed. (An entirely different question is to what extent 
wage and income proportions really reflect the value of importance 
of the work performed.) Naturally, this train of thought cannot lead 
us to take a ‘this is important, that is also important’ kind of stand 
when we are evaluating the motives of why people leave their places 
of employment.
Our research activities have convinced us that in the present stage 
of our social and economic development, economic considerations play 
a decisive role in the labour mobility of both manual workers and 
employees.'1 There are numerous examples of the most valuable skilled 
workers of our major companies changing their jobs to enter agri­
cultural co-operatives and small factories for significandy higher 
wages. Similarly both trained and unskilled workers float from com­
pany to company with their hourly wages gradually increasing by a 
few ‘fillers’ each time. These people do not view their situation only 
in a static way; at the same time and most realistically they consider 
their future as well.
In the period between 1968-71, in a major machine industrial 
plant where, as elsewhere, the main factor in wage increases was 
seniority, we observed that after a period of ten to twelve years of ser­
vice the increase of wages definitely stopped. In other words, approxi­
mately up to the age of thirty, people ‘ate their future’. By this is meant 
that their personal hourly wages stopped increasing when they arrived 
at the peak of their mental and physical abilities. They faced the 
alternative of either trying to find further financial perspectives ‘to 
create their future’ within the enterprise, or else they left. Their 
decisions were of course never free from non-economic motives, be­
cause the possibility of trying for higher wages was always closely 
related to the kind of workers collective to which they belonged, as 
well as the degree to which an individual was ‘united’ with his col­
leagues.
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The same process can also be observed in the opposite direction. 
We had a chance to keep track of how various members left a mass 
communication organization. Although they occupied what were 
relatively well-paid posts in a generally pleasant collective and their 
work was relatively varied and interesting, one after the other they 
left the organization, because— due to its special nature— it forced 
them to remain anonymous. Their motive for changing their place of 
employment— a kind of prestige requirement— was non-economic. At 
the same time, however, we could not ignore the fact that these people 
never entered positions worse paid than their previous one. So finan­
cial motives also appear as a kind of temptation among what are 
seemingly non-economic motives.
The constellation of circumstances on the basis of which people 
(more or less consciously) evaluate their present or future situation 
within the organization is always a conglomeration of economic and 
other factors. And in this conglomeration, the positive aspects of 
certain elements can only compensate to a limited extent for the 
strong negative aspects of other factors.
A  new type of ‘money-mindedness’ is now a frequent topic for 
discussion. Such discussion centres around cases in which people 
change their work-place in the hope of increased income. A  certain 
‘money-mindedness’ or the emergence of justified financial interests, 
while sometimes exaggerated, can indeed be experienced in this 
country. The new system of economic management provides a field 
of action for those interests which in the past sometimes acted 
destructively under the surface; it releases a strong motivational force 
which was partially restrained and now begins to find the field in 
which it can assert itself. In our view, the appearance of justified 
financial interests is the outcome not so much of the special features 
characterising the economic management of the past few years, but 
much more of the fact that economic development has reached a level 
when it is possible to consume a wide selection of both everyday and 
durable consumer goods.
T h e Effects of the Lack of Organization on an Enterprise Level
It would be wrong to regard the enterprise alone as responsible for 
large scale labour mobility, but it would be equally wrong to relieve 
the enterprise from its responsibility entirely.4 The familiar excuse 
made by some economic leaders seems to be unfounded; they say
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that the central regulation must bear the ‘exclusive’ (although they 
do not usually apply this word the structure of arguments still requires 
it here) responsibility for the high rate of labour turnover. The 
development of labour turnover is inseparable from the operation of 
internal mechanisms within the enterprise, both partial and total. 
The whole structure of the enterprise, the operation of its internal 
organization, has a significant impact on the development of relations 
between individual, group, stratum and company interests. From one 
view-point, the nature of the organization limits and determines the 
emergence of compromises of interests and the possibility of co­
operation within the organization to attain its goals. So these factors 
cannot be unrelated to whether people stay with an enterprise or leave 
it.
The most comprehensive shortcoming of the mechanism of control, 
the system of economic and other incentives determining how people 
act within the organization, originates from the inadequate imple­
mentation of the principle of payment by results. On the one hand, 
this means that the means of deciding on awards, as well as of calling 
people to account, are weak. On the other, the use of the available 
means is not related from the point of view of the organization to 
the positive or negative action of people. In other words, control is 
weak and inconsistent. In these circumstances the financial aspect 
may change from a symbol of the social importance of the work per­
formed into an empty symbol of prestige. For instance, in a building 
industrial plant we examined, production results showed a strong 
deterioration while there was no change in capacity and there was an 
annual increase in the incomes of managers over a three year period. 
We also discovered that the financial advantages enjoyed by the 
various levels of leadership (e.g. shop foremen, site architects, chief 
site architect, section and department heads with functional depart­
ments) were not at all proportionate to the extent of their burdens 
or of their contribution to company results, but depended on their 
hierarchical positions. This unambiguously illustrates that the opera­
tion of the mechanism deciding the distribution of income may some­
times, although not always sharply, cross the principle of payment by 
results.
Since an economic organization is a complex structure in which 
the various elements are characterised both by motion independent 
in a limited way from its components and also by their close inter-
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twining, the distortions of the mechanism of control could not be 
and were not solitary phenomena. They were related to the strong 
distortions appearing in the mechanism of decision-making, the system 
of the assumption of responsibility, and the like. In the building 
industrial plant, we found that many of the tasks, including the supply 
of material, the supply of machinery and the ensuring of a labour 
force, which formally would have been the duties of the functional 
departments, fell on the worst-paid staff group of foremen or site 
architects instead of on the heads of functional departments. The 
‘collective irresponsibility’ of some of the departmental heads in the 
most important questions (such as deadlines, quality, adherence to 
technological discipline, insurance of labour safety conditions, and so 
on) was often replaced by a serious individual responsibility falling 
on those in charge of local production.5
When the actual operation of the enterprise thus deviates from 
its ‘declared’ operation, quite obviously we have a case of disorganiza­
tion : the organizational structure of the enterprise has become 
obsolete, it no longer meets the requirements of changing reality. It 
lacks flexibility and for the time being is very slow to change. So the 
state of disorganization, the distortions of the inner mechanism of the 
enterprise— especially the system of incentives— contribute to the 
emergence of a situation in which certain groups and strata within the 
organization bear disproportionately heavy burdens in comparison to 
the advantages they enjoy. Their interests are not met. In this situa­
tion— if demand for labour overall makes it feasible— one possible 
extreme reaction of the individual is to leave his job. It is no accident 
that it was precisely from amongst the ranks of production managers 
bearing the heaviest burdens that several foremen and site architects 
were drawn who left the plant and joined other enterprises to enter 
‘quiet’ posts involving less nervous tension but providing equal or 
even less pay. The same motive led skilled workers in a machine tool 
plant to change their work-place. They worked under extremely hard 
physical conditions and, in addition, had to wage a monthly struggle 
against company efforts aimed at reducing their incomes through 
inadequately based piece rate cuts, withdrawal of reward bonuses and 
of payment for overtime work.
From this point of view, large scale labour mobility is a typical 
symptom of disorganization at the company level.
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T he R ole of the Informal Organization
The most direct and sharpest criticism of the operation of an 
economic organization is the wide-spread existence and influence of 
in fo rm al organizations. An informal organization is a collectivity of 
those individuals and groups that, in addition to their officially regu­
lated contacts within the enterprise, are also connected by unofficial 
links. These unofficial links, however, are always based on real unity 
of interests, shown in a co-ordinated, although often not conscious, 
action. The greater the role of the unofficial organization is, the more 
rigid and out-of-date is the formal organization of the enterprise. The 
unofficial organization is an indispensable promoter and stabilizer, 
but at the same time it may also be an enemy and source of distortion 
of the operation of the formal organization. The role played by the 
informal organization in the field of labour mobility not only calls 
attention to the present lack of organization within a number of enter­
prises, but also to the fact that it is wrong to regard leaving a parti­
cular job as an individual action. For, precisely because of the 
existence of the informal organization, we found collective action in a 
significant portion of all cases. This was carried out not only by 
individuals but by such groups and strata as, for one reason or 
another, found themselves in a temporarily or extendedly unfavourable 
situation. We will illustrate this with an example from the building 
industry.
The building industrial enterprise X  came to life from a merger 
of enterprises A  and B in 1967 and the merger took place in such a 
way that nearly the complete staff of workers and all the posts of 
production management (i.e. shop foremen, site architects, chief site 
architects) were preserved and the new enterprise was even completed 
with various specialized industrial departments. On the other hand, 
higher managerial posts were reduced to half their original number. 
There had to be immediate bargaining about the top posts. Agree­
ment was reached on a kind of ‘parity’ system. The general manager 
came from enterprise A, the chief accountant from enterprise B. No 
agreement was reached concerning the person of the chief engineer, 
who finally came from outside the two enterprises in question. The 
secretary of the Party committee was from A; the trade union secre­
tary from B; some of the functional departmental heads from A, 
others from B, and so on. Because of the limited number of posts the 
process had its winners and losers, and so a fierce struggle started
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between the groups in question to change the situation. As a result 
of the struggle between the informal groups, in the period between 
1967 and 1969, a number of leaders of B origin were manoeuvred 
out of the enterprise headquarters and actually left the company. 
Meanwhile production deteriorated and superior organizations felt it 
was time to intervene: the superior Party organization removed the 
Party secretary of A  origin, who had taken an active part in the 
‘struggle’. There was then another temporary compromise between 
ra m p s  A  and B, but it did not last long and there was no improve­
ment in production either. The next step was taken by the ministry, 
which intervened in 1970 and removed the general manager and 
appointed an outside person to the post. This resulted in an improve­
ment of the situation. However, the new general manager brought 
with him a number of new leaders and now it was the turn of leaders 
of A  origin, who had previously enjoyed a privileged position, to 
feel slighted and to leave the enterprise in large numbers. As formu­
lated at the enterprise: the new general manager brought along, and 
the old one took with him, his own ‘suite’.
Protection of Individual and Collective Interests
People often change jobs to protect their own interests because of 
the lack of a compromise of interests within the organization. Large 
scale labour mobility is therefore an indicator of the existence of 
problems concerning protection of individual interests within the 
enterprise. Of course, it would be a mistake to draw the tempting 
conclusion from this that— as some leaders believe— everything used 
to be in order in the past and conflicts of interest are of recent origin, 
generated by the new system of economic management which shatters 
the previously existing ‘united’ interests of workers of the same enter­
prise. On the contrary: the gradual abolition of central limitations 
impeding the free movement of labour and the emerging demand for 
large-scale labour have brought to the surface tensions that had 
previously also existed (see below) and they made visible existing 
short-comings in the field of ‘official’ interest protection. A  large-scale 
demand for labour has opened the possibility of people leaving their 
place of work and armed some strata of workers, especially young 
people, and trained workers, with a new and unofficial means of pro­
tecting their interests, which they do not hesitate to use.6
Trade unions are often still not able to protect effectively workers’
Labour Turnover and the Economic Organization
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interests, particularly since they ignored the problem for a long time 
and since under changing conditions of economic management reform 
the situation is dynamic. This is true despite their rights of veto and 
the vehement debates conducted with many factory managers since
1968.
In economic organizations trade unions usually adopt the correct 
stand in principle: that they act in the service of enterprise interests 
since they work to promote co-operation within the enterprise. This 
outlook is useful if it is based on the realistic recognition that interests 
differ and clash within the enterprise because of the complicated 
social and economic causes and that conflicts of interests are natural 
phenomena, requiring compromise. In these circumstances trade 
unions play the very useful roles of explorer, co-ordinator and 
equalizer. Unfortunately, for many trade union leaders the ‘service 
of company interest in general’ stands for a kind of evasion of the 
actually existing concrete problems.
W e have often experienced how embarrassing it is for trade union 
committees to be forced to take a stand in a conflict between workers 
and management. This is because the trade union members include 
both managers and workers. Furthermore the trade unions cannot 
judge the situation because despite their full-time leaders they have 
no independent apparatus. Officials (including workers, shop foremen, 
works managers and even higher managers) view the various problems 
and take their stand not so much from a trade union point of view 
but from that of their own ‘status’ . They cannot therefore provide the 
full-time leaders with an objective orientation. ‘The trouble is’—  
workers often say— ‘that the trade union officials are also on the com­
pany payroll.’ This can lead to a situation in which the full-time 
trade union leadership does not and cannot know what is actually 
happening in the factory. The trade union organization itself becomes 
a battlefield of conflicts of interests.
At the same time it should be remembered that the protection of 
interests is not confined to action against the company management. 
This is only a part of the problem of the trade union not representing 
the interests of the workers forcefully enough. Another often neglected 
source of difficulties is that the interests of certain strata and groups 
of workers are not adequately protected against those of others. For 
as long as the amount of distributable wages is fixed, financial advan­
tages and privileges won by various methods (including the threat
276
Lajos Hethy and Csaba Mako
or actuality of leaving by some strata of workers) are gained— as in 
the past— at the expense of the financial situation of others. This 
of course applies not only to the workers but to employees of the 
enterprise as a whole. Financial advantages obtained by strength in 
bargaining may appear as a healthy correction of an obsolete state 
of affairs. However, these advantages may not relate to the level of 
work performed. Trade unions often take no interest in this.
It is therefore no accident that the trade unions’ function of pro­
tecting individual interests is often taken over by professional manage­
ment, which tries to balance conflicting interests and to establish co­
operation, since it is the professional management that has to produce 
measurable results. Occasionally these tasks fall to the already over­
burdened Party organization. Trade unions often— ignoring the exist­
ing realities— deny and try to veil conflicts and instead of protecting 
the just interests of strata of workers who are actually in a poor situa­
tion, claim to be protecting the interests of the ‘workers’ in general. 
Meanwhile large-scale labour mobility goes on unaffected by trade 
union activity.
What is certain is that both deficiencies in company organization 
and shortcomings in trade union activity have contributed in more 
than one place to the informal organization becoming very strong. 
For example personal ‘contacts’ assume great significance within 
various enterprises, and the unofficial organization— side by side with 
its other functions— becomes a most effective forum to ensure the 
protection of individual interests. T o  some extent this is a positive 
phemonenon, for some people are thus provided with an effective 
forum of interest protection. But it is also partly negative, since an 
uncontrollable informal organization can never be a substitute for an 
effective formal organization for the protection of individuals, estab­
lished for the workers as a whole.
Labour mobility throws light on constructional and operational 
shortcomings within both the organization of the enterprise and the 
trade union. However, we should emphasise that, once again, we are 
not describing a negative situation of recent origin. The trade unions 
still bear the marks of the period in which declarations about unity 
of interests served to hide the existing conflicts of interests and there 
was no official acceptance of individual or collective protection of 
interest. When the new system of economic management was in 
preparation, the central bodies took into consideration the possibility
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of conflicts of interests under socialist conditions and that therefore 
there was a need for trade unions to protect the collective and 
individual rights of the workers and to represent their everyday 
interests.7
The organizational shortcomings of enterprises are also inherited 
from the past. The system of central directives and the one-sided 
requirements to produce the set quantity of products, set very low 
requirements for the modernization of the inner mechanism of the 
enterprise. They also held back its development and at the same time 
concealed its out-of-date features. Today, in contrast, the requirements 
of complex economic efficiency demanded by development and em­
phasised by the new system of economic management, together with 
the increased independence of managers in combining the factors of 
production, pre-suppose an up-to-date, highly developed inner 
mechanism and precisely as a result of labour mobility will, sooner 
or later bring to the surface the existing accumulated insufficiencies. 
T o  abolish these, a number of central resolutions have been adopted.8
The central resolutions envisage and pave the way towards a 
renewal of the operations of our organizations. For reasons that will 
now be apparent, the process of transformation will not be easy or 
rapid but its first phase, the exploration of the situation, has already 
started.
T h e Emergence of Speculation
Seen from the viewpoint of the organization, the necessarily ex­
tended nature of hidden, informal interest protection which was once 
closely related to many people leaving their places of work and is 
still related to a number of negative forms of collective behaviour, 
remains dangerous, because it is difficult to survey, let alone control. 
This is clearly illustrated by the fact that in the past few years, labour 
mobility was not only an expression of the dissatisfaction felt within 
the enterprise by certain individuals, groups and strata and a means 
of putting an end to dissatisfaction, but that it has also become a 
source of speculation.
Speculation emerged among nearly every stratum of workers and 
on the part of the organizations as well. This should be emphasised 
because it has become customary to shift the moral responsibility for 
speculation on to the shoulders of ‘floaters’. In a large number of 
cases it was not only vulnerable individuals and groups who changed
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their work-place, but also those workers in strong positions who 
sought to change their favourable situation for an even more favour­
able one. As a typical example, in the building industry teams of 
bricklayers and carpenters of outstanding ability have often collectively 
left one working place after another, each time screwing yet a little 
higher their originally high hourly wages. The special new stratum of 
manpower recruiters played an active part in this process. Under the 
pressure of circumstances, speculation was accepted and practised by 
enterprises. In the building industry it happened on several occasions 
that individuals were appointed to high positions in production man­
agement only because they pledged to bring with them some hundreds 
of workers. At the same time, in a certain sense the economic organiza­
tions also initiated the process. For instance, it can be regarded as 
nothing but speculation when, with the exclusive intention of im­
proving (by lowering) the average wage level, an enterprise employed 
workers in low-paid posts without expecting anything but their 
presence and without being prepared to grant them anything on top 
of their low hourly wages. It is not surprising that these ‘filling-men’ 
soon left the company.
Enticement of labour by the enterprise is also consistent with certain 
attitudes. It is common knowledge that our economy is in a period 
of transformation in which a relatively dynamic growth must be 
assured. W e no longer however have the means previously at our 
disposal, including labour reserves. Company leaders, however, not 
yet fully aware of this situation, have overestimated their possibilities 
of labour acquisition, as is manifested in the plans of a significant 
number of enterprises. Accordingly, they fight to obtain manpower—  
sometimes by dubious means.
As in other unrelated processes already described, speculation by 
workers and organizations is an important component of the large 
scale labour mobility. As a result many have come to the conclusion 
that administrative action taken against speculation is an effective 
means against large scale mobility, and such measures have actually 
been taken. We do not deny that, under certain conditions, adminis­
trative interference may be successful, but we believe that the nearly 
uncontrollable speculation with manpower is just as much the product 
of a complex and wide system of social and economic relations, as is 
that floating which is rooted in a just feeling of injured interests. It 
can therefore hardly be abolished by administrative action alone.
279
Labour Turnover and the Economic Organization
All this of course does not relieve of responsibility those ministries 
and branch organizations that contribute to the preservation of nega­
tive phenomena at enterprises precisely through their incompetent 
administrative measures and their loose control over the measures 
that they do take.
The Impact of Central Regulators
In no economy is the enterprise ‘an island of its own’, and even 
less is it an ‘island’ in a centrally planned socialist economy; in other 
words, the whole construction and operation of the enterprise is ex­
posed to powerful outside influences. The same applies to the workers 
in the enterprise: they are affected by their surroundings not only 
within but outside the enterprise. Although it is difficult to define 
exactly the role of its various components, large-scale labour mobility 
in our country was the outcome in equal measure of the organizational 
and operational shortcomings of the various enterprises, the insuffici­
encies of the system of economic regulation, and, above all, the 
historically established social and economic realities that define both.
The central economic regulators always embody certain preferences, 
which means that they give priority to certain aims on the basis of 
the realistic evaluation of social, economic and, indeed, international 
potentialities. This is certainly true for those measures— control of 
average wages and the free movement of the labour— that used to be 
the main macro-factors of labour mobility. The control of average 
wages is intended to prevent the new system of economic management 
from resulting in temporary unemployment, a disproportion in supply 
and demand on the consumer market, and a process of rapid inflation, 
while freeing the movement of labour. In some respects these factors 
provided a more or less good substitute for the above-mentioned 
shortcomings of the institutionalized protection of the workers’ 
interests. We are here arguing only that the accompanying negative 
aspects were not reduced to a minimum by the maximum attainment 
of preferred aims.
As a matter of fact, the difficulty for enterprises did not lie only 
in the existence of average wage control but in the fact th a t the per 
capita wage level was fixed in a undifferentiated way and at a relatively 
low level (compared with non state industry) at the same timt* as free 
movement of labour was allowed.
Obviously, there is no economic organization in the world that
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would allow unlimited movement of wage levels. As limits to the 
movement of wage levels, the point of ‘maximum’ fixed by bourgeois 
economy9 indicates the level above which the enterprise will be in­
solvent, while the point of ‘minimum’ indicates the level under which 
the enterprise is unable to attract manpower. Although the points of 
minimum and maximum cannot be adapted to the Hungarian economy 
in their original interpretation, they do provide some food for thought 
along parallel lines.
At the machine industrial enterprise we examined in 1968-1971 
we were aware that the enterprise could not raise its wages level be­
cause its profits were insufficient for significant wage increases, but, 
at the same time, it was unable to attract manpower. In other words, 
the enterprise found itself in a situation in which the two extreme 
points set by the existing realities of the movement of wage levels fell 
very near each other, and one could even say that the point of maxi­
mum fell below the point of minimum. From the point of view of 
the enterprise, under the given conditions, the given state of average 
wage control made it impossible for the organisation to employ the 
well paid labour force required for its operation. Instead, it substituted 
the unutilised but necessary mental and physical abilities of some 
‘idlers’ at the enterprise by the employment of new manpower whose 
mental and physical capacities would also not be fully utilised. This, 
on the other hand, means that ‘unemployment has assumed a per­
manent character within the factory’, or, in other words, the enterprise 
set an artificial demand for labour. The state of average wage control 
also had its unfavourable consequences for some of the workers of 
the enterprise. Workers were trying to find a financial perspective and 
to attain this they were able and willing to work more. In this situation, 
however, they received more or less the ‘average’ income irrespective 
of whether they worked more and better, or less and worse, for the 
enterprise was unable to pay more even if it wanted to. A  significant 
portion of people fiercely fought against this and searched for a 
possibility of escape.
Central regulation contributed to the proportion of people changing 
their places of employment being high. Thus the dissatisfaction 
workers felt concerning their financial perspective increased the large- 
scale supply on the labour market. Its role was also shown in that 
enterprises could not take the appropriate steps to overcome the 
problems arising from the lack of organization and so they could not
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develop effective systems of incentives. Thus they were unable to 
bring to the surface the necessary reserves of their employees through 
a strengthening of discipline at work and intensity of labour and they 
created a large-scale partially artificial demand for labour. The 
regulation also contributed to largely identical development arising 
from the levelling up of the average wage level of the ‘soundness’ of 
state enterprises. This meant that they had no possibility of keeping 
labour by offering lasting advantages. In other words, once started, 
the cycle can only come to a halt in the long run when the level at 
which wages are regulated has been corrected. Its effect was also felt 
in that the co-operative undertakings (subsidiary enterprises of agri­
cultural co-operatives) unaffected by the regulation of average wages, 
entered into strong competition with state enterprises, which the latter 
often could not cope with. They thus suddenly found themselves in a 
most difficult situation. This situation may be improved to a great 
extent by the wage increases and other measures granted to workers in 
industry, including in the first place the building industry.
Other shortcomings of central control have also contributed to 
the fact that the expectation of the new economic management con­
cerning the re-grouping of labour to effective branches has not been 
adequately fulfilled. For example efforts aimed at establishing an 
adequately close and strong relationship between the possibility of 
wage increases, profits and company efficiency have not been, and in 
the short period at our disposal perhaps could not be, successful under 
present conditions.
Changed Relations of Interest10
The evaluation of labour mobility as an important social and 
economic phenomenon cannot lack historical consideration. For in­
stance, as already mentioned, large scale floating in the ranks of 
manual workers was not just a symptom of dissatisfaction and of 
organizational conflicts of interests of a more recent origin (although 
it was this as well), but rather of such long-stifled divergencies of 
interests that previously had also found their expression in other 
negative forms of behaviour. At this point in time, the liberation of 
labour mobility, it emerged to the surface in a demonstrative way. 
We can hardly undertake the task of describing the whole system of 
complex ‘historical’ contradictions that occurred in the inner relation­
ships of workers in the past twenty years, but we still feel we should
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point to some of these.
As a precondition of the industrial development project in the 
fifties, there emerged a requirement on the part of enterprises to 
possess qualified staff groups of skilled workers. As a result of rapid 
training, a sometimes highly, sometimes very poorly qualified stratum 
of skilled workers came into existence that still forms the backbone 
of the staff group of skilled workers. In this period there were 
enormous differentials between these skilled workers and the group 
of trained and unskilled workers in relation to both wages and social 
prestige. This often expressed not so much the actually existing 
differences in professional knowledge and production results, but 
rather was a manifestation of the realistic endeavour of industry to 
create— on the side of the labour force— a guarantee of the fulfilment 
of tasks; i.e. to possess a stable staff-group of workers.
Meanwhile the situation has changed in a number of respects. The 
industry trained more and more workers who were significantly better 
qualified than a proportion of the old ones. A t the same time, in 
contrast to the old well-paid workers living in financially sound 
circumstances, the much worse paid young skilled workers, trained 
workers and unskilled workers often have to face the grave burdens 
of acquiring and furnishing a home of their own. All this has resulted 
in a large number of tensions.
By levelling up the previously significant differentials in the wages 
of the various strata of workers, large scale labour mobility showed 
that privileges enjoyed by a part of the old staff were out-of-date and 
unjustified. This has brought about in practice such a levelling off 
in wages that the basis of differentiation in future may well be based 
on realistic production results. At the same time it has eased the 
conflicts of interest between various strata of workers within the 
enterprise and has paved the way for the superficial lack of conflicts 
to be replaced by well-founded compromises of interests.
From the point of view of the economy and organizational sociology, 
large scale labour mobility has resulted in a number of temporary 
damages. These losses cannot be expressed in terms of the forint-value 
of the lost working hours caused by a person leaving the enterprise or 
in the loss of some of the cost spent on training manpower. As far as 
we can judge, it has affected our economy most at two points: on the 
one hand, as is well-known to economic leaders, because of a lack 
of an adequate differentiation of economic regulators, well-qualified
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labour streamed from the efficient branches to less efficient branches. 
On the other hand, it impeded the much needed improvement of the 
level of organization with various enterprises. According to Taylorian 
experiences, far-reaching reorganization of an enterprise requires some 
four to eight years. However, if the composition of workers and 
especially that of the leadership is in a process of permanent trans­
formation and, consequently, urgent daily problems push long-range 
problems into the background, then the period of time required for 
organising the enterprise will be even longer.
On the other side of the picture, however, labour mobility un­
doubtedly also had its positive consequences. It has called attention 
to the insufficient and long standing state of health of the enterprises 
and the economy: to the out-of-date character and rigidity of certain 
organizational forms, to the lack of organization that can be experi­
enced with a number of enterprises, to the shortcomings of the 
institutionalized forms of interest protection, to the insufficiently 
differentiated character of the central regulators, to the inadequacies 
of certain organizational ideologies, and so on. At the same time, 
although partially and in a number of its features in a distorted way, 
the process of labour mobility corrected the relations of interest within 
the enterprise in such a way that some of the conflicts which came to 
the surface were eased and sometimes solved; in other words, there has 
been an improvement within the various enterprises in the conditions 
for co-operation that is of basic importance with regard to organiza­
tional objectives.
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